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In her introduction to her 1984 text, The Second Self, Sherry Turkle contrasts our
study of the computer-an object that exists ''betwixt and between,''''a new mind
that is not yet a mind"-with early studies of the Wild Child of Aveyron, another
phenomenon that she argues poses similar questions about the nature of humanity.
The Wild Child was a boy of about thirteen who was discovered in 1800 in the
Aveyron region of Southern France. To all appearances, he had spent his entire life
surviving alone in the wilderness. He could not speak and seemed to make only
meaningless utterances. As Turkle suggests, the Wild Child ''became the occasion
for what has been called 'the forbidden experiment,' the experiment that
would reveal what human beings really are beneath the overlay of society and
culture" (11).
Turkle argues that, as with our study of the Wild Child whom we wanted to
speak to us of our relation with nature, we ask the idea and object of the computer
to speak to us about "where we stand in the world of artifact" (12). She writes,
"We search for a link between who we are and what we have made, between who
we are and what we might create, between who we are and what, through our
intimacy with our own creations, we might become" (12).
In the twenty years since Turkle's study was first published, we have only
begun to grapple with how people make relationships with digital objects, and
what the vicissitudes of those relationships make of the subjects and objects they
encompass. In thinking about these questions, I am drawn to an emerging genre
of autobiographical narratives, memoirs, and auto-ethnographies, sometimes
referred to as "technobiographies" (Henwood, Kennedy and Miller), which
describe the use and usefulness of digital objects in complex ways, as both social
and affective as well as technical. These technobiographies offer stories about
ambivalence and uncertainty in our relations with objects of the digital age. In this
essay, I want to consider the question that Turkle suggests about "what, through
our intimacy with our creations, we might become." Put another way, I am
wondering how we might understand these narratives of the digital subject and
object as stories of learning?
In his memoir, Extra Lye, about "coming of age in cyberspace," David
Bennahum writes that "part of the success of digital toys lay in their nature: they
were not just toys, but playmates" (25). While his acknowledgement of the experience
of toys as playmates is, in itself, not particularly remarkable, Bennahum suggests
that there is something remarkable about his initial experience of the electronic or
digital animation of the object that made it, for him, an active-and surprisingly
powerful-social partner in play. Bennahum describes his early interest in the first
handheld digital games this way:
MyoId toys-Star Trek dolls, plastic guns-were dead things. They didn't move the way
these new toys moved, and they weren't smart. These inventions represented a new digi-
tal way to play. They played back, reacting to what you did. And in this was something
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entirely new: an experience of communication-dialogue-with an inanimate object.
We actually played together. This would become the singular characteristic of a digital
world-machines that felt alive, malleable, responsive, changeable over time. (25)
Like Bennahum, the children in Turkle's study are both excited and disturbed
to discover the degree to which digital games seem able to both respond and not
respond in unexpected ways. Turkle describes a six-year-old named Laura, who
reacts emotionally to the fact that the computer toy, Merlin, is able to repeatedly
beat her at tic-tac-toe, and a seven-year-old named Paul, who, when the toy will
not allow him to shut it off, enjoys repeatedly "killing" the Speak and Spell by
removing its batteries.
In these stories about the use of the digital object, what is curious is that the
intended "usefulness" of the machine is not of primary importance. Instead, these
children imbue the digital object with their own meanings and uses. Like the
children inTurkle's study who become focused on killing and reviving the machine
by putting in and taking out its batteries rather than playing the game it offers,
there are many other examples of children acting in opposition to a digital game's
intended use: stories of children intentionally and repeatedly smashing up their
cars in racing games or allowing the Sims character they are meant to protect,
starve to death.
In this way, the digital object is not simply a tool with a technical or functional
use, but also an encounter in which we work through our relation to the outside
world. In this sense, these digital objects become sites of curriculum.
The complexity of these relations for adults is beautifully illustrated by Gary
Lee Downey in The Machine in Me, his 1998 auto-ethnography about living among
computer engineers and engineering students. Downey elaborates on the com-
plexity of the negotiation between inside and outside when he suggests that, in
order to understand the experiences of computer engineers, "one possible pathway
may be to think about each machine as a configuration of agencies-acts of
positioning-that are part-human, and of each human as a configuration of
agencies that are part-machine" (6).
At one point in his study, Downey describes the difficulties engineering
students are having in accepting this shared agency, because it means "questioning
the whole content of engineering knowledge as repeated iterations of submission
and control" (158). Students enrolled in a course on technologies of Computer-
Assisted Design/Computer-Assisted Manufacturing (CAD/CAM), had expected
to gain a sense of mastery, but found instead that they had to enter into an
exchange with some other configuration of agencies located within the computer.
For each student, gaining access to the technology through its elaborate protocol
of "logging in" established a connection between the human and the machine that,
in its complexity, exceeded the relation of control and submission the students
were expecting. Downey writes:
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Without following these steps, the user's agency could not exist, nor would the user
itself. In other words, just as these novice humans were beginning to extend their
agencies inside the computer to participate in an electronic exchange, so the computer
was extending its agencies into their bodies, producing a significant bodily interaction and
exchange. (152)
Rosanne Stone uses the notion of prosthesis to describe her own experience of
the interpenetration of human and machine. In contrast to the common concep-
tualization of the computer as a tool, discrete and separate from the human who
wields it, Stone argues that as prostheses, digital technologies are inseparable from
the humans who experience them as extensions of their will and identity. She asks,
what happens when a technological prosthesis becomes necessary to one's
identity?Where do we stop and where does the technological object begin? Where
are our edges?
In trying to make sense of our intimacy with and ambivalence towards the
machines that populate our lives, these technobiographical narratives and the
strange use of digital objects they illustrate offer two interconnected stories of
learning: first, they narrate the ways in which objects become imbued with
psychological meaning; second, they tell us about the usefulness of these digital
objects in our negotiation of the relationship between inner life and external
reality.
For Turkle, the computer, like the Wild Child, is both an "evocative object"
and a "marginal object." As with many other cultural icons and objects that exist
on the edge of mind-such as the madman and the monster-the computer exists
''both within and outside the normal social order [... ] both within and outside our
normal categories of what is alive" (24). Most technobiographies seem to echo the
narratives of the children in Turkle's study who experience the computer as a site
of subjectivity and have a hard time determining whether or not these digital
machines are in fact, alive, and, in the context of digital technologies, what counts
as a living thing.
Turkle suggests that computers function as "marginal objects on the boundary
between the physical and psychological" (3 I ). In her study, she noticed that
children's beliefs about computers did not correspond to previous research on the
development of their perceptions about animate and inanimate objects. According
to Jean Piaget, as quoted by Turkle:
Childhood animism [...1is only gradually displaced by new ways of understanding the
physical world in terms of phYSical processes. In time the child learns that the stone falls
because of gravity; intentions have nothing to do with it. And so a dichotomy is con-
structed: phYSical and psychological properties stand opposed to one another in two
great systems. (30)
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However, Turkle's extensive interviews with children and adults about their
experiences of computers have led her to conclude that the computer is, for most
of us, a new kind of object: it is an object that disrupts the dichotomy between the
physical and the psychological. The computer is "psychological, yet a thing" (31).
Object relations theorists understand the "evocative object" as an object
external to the subject that becomes evocative because we affect it with inner
meaning (Bollas). Psychoanalysis uses the idea of "symbolization" to describe how
the object is imbued with meanings in such a way that it becomes evocative of new
ideas and new worlds. In its most primary form, symbolization allows the infant
to use transitional objects to stand in for an experience of union with the mother
until the infant is more fully able to accept the reality of separation.
As Donald Winnicott suggests, transitional objects or phenomena are devel-
opmentally necessary for the infant to progress to the recognition of external
reality and to an experience of the world. Often in the guise of a well-loved teddy
bear or blanket-and later in the guise of a digital toy or Sims character-the
transitional object is perceived by the child to be both "me" and "not-me": it is
never under complete control like an internal object, nor is it outside the child's
control as is the external object of the mother. The parent makes an agreement
with the baby, Winnicott argues, not to force differentiation between primary
creativity and objective perception of the transitional object. The parent must
never ask, "[D]id you conceive of this or was it presented to you from without?"
(12). This allows for a neutral area of experience in which the child gets to have
the illusion that external reality corresponds to her own capacity to create.
Ultimately, the task of parents and educators is disillusionment, and the
child's developmental task is that of reality-acceptance, although each of these
tasks is interminable. Winnicott writes that the transitional object is what we see
of "the infant's journey from the purely subjective to objectivity [... ] of this
journey of progress toward experiencing" (6). The intermediate area of experience
posed by the transitional object "is necessary for the initiation of a relationship
between the child and the world" (13). The intermediate area of experience is
where we work out the dynamics that become our way of relating to the external
world and ourselves, where we learn how to learn and to think, or as Maxine
Greene might suggest, to engage in learning as a reordering of the self.
The notion of the transitional object and the process of symbolization both
return us to Turkle's observations about the computer as an evocative object,
which entices us to explore "who we are and what, through our intimacy with our
own creations, we might become" (12). This question about the relations,
encounters, and intimacies that constitute learning stands in contrast against more
frequently considered questions about "media effects," or the effect of the digital
object on the subject. In this way, these technobiographies offer stories of learning
that are not easy for educators.
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As Alice Pitt argues, object relations is less interested "in what we learn from
our encounters with knowledge about the world; rather [... ] [it] is curious about
what we use knowledge to do" (87). Her remarks suggest that we consider curricular
experiences and objects not primarily in terms of their content, "but rather as a
method for observing how we experience ourselves in the world" (89). Following
Pitt's lead, I ask, how do digital objects allow us to observe our experience in the
world?The writers of the memoirs and narratives that constitute technobiographies
follow the strange vicissitudes of their relationships with digital objects in order
to explore just that. Their stories of learning can broaden our curricular under-
standing of the use of the digital object, not simply as a tool of transmission, but
as an evocative object that can facilitate the working out of reality acceptance and
the attachment to new ideas.
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